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Abstract— This paper examines the relationship between 
schedule delays and cost overruns on complex projects. It is 
generally accepted by many project practitioners that cost 
overruns are directly related to schedule delays. But what does 
“directly related to” actually mean? Some reasons or root 
causes for schedule delays and associated cost overruns are 
obvious, if only in hindsight. For example, unrealistic estimates, 
supply chain difficulties, insufficient schedule margin, technical 
problems, scope changes, or the occurrence of risk events can 
negatively impact schedule performance. Other factors driving 
schedule delays and cost overruns may be less obvious and more 
difficult to quantify. Examples of these less obvious factors 
include project complexity, flawed estimating assumptions, 
over-optimism, political factors, “black swan” events, or even 
poor leadership and communication. Indeed, is it even possible 
the schedule itself could be a source of delay and subsequent cost 
overrun? Through literature review, surveys of project 
practitioners, and the authors’ own experience on NASA 
programs and projects, the authors will categorize and examine 
the various factors affecting the relationship between project 
schedule delays and cost growth. The authors will also propose 
some ideas for organizations to consider to help create an 
awareness of the factors which could cause or influence schedule 
delays and associated cost growth on complex projects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cost overruns on government programs frequently attract 
significant attention from federal agency executive 
leadership, the Government Accountability Office, Congress, 
the White House, and even the public at large. One could 
argue that in the face of shrinking budgets, some federal 
agencies are incentivized to unrealistically minimize cost and 
exaggerate maximum technical performance. The optimistic 
assumptions associated with the minimum cost/maximum 
performance precept become integral to program baselines 
which, lead to cost overruns. As more desirable programs 
chase decreased Agency funding, the incentive to 
underestimate program cost increases. Later, when funding 
shortfalls actually happen, inefficient practices of deferring 
work, cutting scope and capability, or shifting funding 
between projects occurs. These shortsighted adjustments, of 
course, continue to exacerbate cost growth [1]. 
Closely aligned with an unrealistic program cost position 
may be an equally unrealistic, success-oriented schedule. In 
fact, in the operational reality of project formulation and 
implementation, a sure-fire path to a cost overrun is an 
unachievable schedule. However, the relationship between 
schedule delays and cost overruns is multifaceted. Does a 
schedule delay always translate into a cost overrun? Are there 
other aspects of the schedule that contribute to cost overruns, 
even though a delay is not experienced? Can most cost 
overruns be traced to root causes in the schedule execution, 
or are there other explanations? While the authors could not 
locate a specific source, the view that “80 to 90 percent of 
cost overruns are due to schedule” is often discussed among 
project practitioners. While it may be difficult to 
quantitatively support or refute this view, perhaps an 
examination of the anecdotal, empirical, and observed data 
and experiences can shed more light on this claim. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
has developed and managed some of the world’s most 
complex systems and projects. Yet, along with that scientific 
success, the Agency has also experienced significant cost 
overruns and schedule delays. Within NASA, the Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC) has more than a 50-year history 
of managing complex, scientific projects including weather 
satellites, Earth observing satellites, and space 
communication systems, along with solar, planetary and deep 
space observatories. GSFC’s projects are technically 
complicated and programmatically complex, often 
integrating in-house work with effort from industry 
contractors, international partners, and other NASA centers. 
In light of previous schedule delays and cost overruns on 
some of these projects, GSFC has instituted a number of 
organizational, technical, and project management initiatives 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160003386 2019-08-31T04:05:07+00:00Z
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to improve performance of cost and schedule. The Business 
Change Initiative (BCI) resulted in over 100 changes in the 
areas of scheduling, Earned Value Management (EVM), cost 
estimating, management reporting, and risk management to 
enhance project teams’ ability to plan and control projects to 
better achieve their cost and schedule performance targets. 
Some of these BCI changes are included in the 
recommendations at the end of this paper. Similarly, GSFC’s 
project experiences along with insights from other project 
practitioners provide a fresh perspective on the relationship 
between cost overruns and schedule delays. 
 
2. SCHEDULE DELAY PERSPECTIVES 
“Time is money,” Benjamin Franklin observed long ago. The 
project management equivalent to Dr. Franklin’s observation 
for today’s project practitioner might be “as the schedule 
goes, so goes the cost.” Therefore, avoiding or minimizing 
schedule growth is important to projects because it saves 
money that might be put to more effective use elsewhere, 
besides funding cost growth and overruns caused by these 
delays. But what is the nature of schedule delays and overruns 
in today’s complex project environment like that at GSFC? 
Table 1 summarizes the authors’ perspective on the major 
themes within which schedule delays and overruns can be 
characterized. 
First, insufficient scope planning occurs when work scope is 
incorrectly included or excluded from the project schedule. 
Since the work is not in the baseline plan, it eventually 
“creeps” back into the schedule forecast and estimate-to-
complete translating into schedule delays and additional cost 
growth. Likewise, lack of effective change management from 
the initial evaluation of a potential technical or programmatic 
change through to its successful implementation into the 
project can lead to time delays, if not coordinated properly.  
Of course, inadequate requirements definition can adversely 
impact scope planning and change management processes 
too, ultimately leading to schedule delays and cost overruns.  
Therefore, proper requirements management is essential for 
avoiding schedule and cost problems to begin with. 
Another recurring theme concerns the constraints projects 
create by preparing success-oriented estimates of activity 
durations. A success-oriented schedule means everything has 
to go exactly right and is estimated to complete the activity 
as planned—not a very likely outcome for the majority of 
tasks, given the uncertainty associated with duration 
estimates. Nevertheless, projects can leverage techniques 
such as three-point estimates and schedule margin planning 
to offset inefficiency to some degree. 
Next, at organizations such as GSFC, projects are complex 
and adapting to new technologies, or troubleshooting 
difficulties inherent in new technologies, can mean trouble 
for the schedule since challenges cannot be fully understood 
at the beginning of the project life cycle and difficulties may 
occur later [2]. From a schedule development perspective, 
programmatic complexity is expressed, in part, through the 
schedule logic within the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS). 
 
 
Table 1. Schedule Overrun/Delay Themes 
Schedule Overrun/Delay Themes 
Affected Project Management 
Processes 
Impact/Outcome 
Insufficient scope planning; ineffective 
change management; inadequate 
requirements definition 
Activity definition; baseline control; 
requirements management 
Missing or under-scoped planning 
packages, work packages, and 
activities 
Success-oriented estimates Activity duration estimating Overoptimistic planning package, work 
package, and activity duration 
estimates 
Project complexity Activity sequencing Missing or incorrectly defined schedule 
logic and dependencies; merge bias 
Inadequate risk assessment Probabilistic schedule risk analysis Overloaded risks; underestimated risk 
probabilities and impacts 
Technical/programmatic problems Risk management; schedule margin 
planning 
Performance inefficiency; schedule 
margin erosion; missed milestones 
Other (leadership, communication, 
supplier, process, etc. problems) 
All Performance inefficiency; schedule 
margin erosion; missed milestones 
"Black Swan" events Recovery planning, continuous 
planning 
Major schedule impact; major replan; 
project termination 
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When a dependency for a deliverable is overlooked or linked 
incorrectly in the IMS, it could result in a significant schedule 
impact once the problem is detected and resolved. Several 
years ago, a component delivery from a GSFC contractor was 
incorrectly linked to its point of need in the spacecraft 
integration and test flow. Once the problem was identified 
and the correct dependency established, it translated into a 
potential multi-month schedule delay. Significant time and 
cost on the part of the project team and contractor was 
invested (including the allocation of some schedule margin) 
to work around the problem, which was eventually solved. 
Even more challenging from a project complexity standpoint 
is when multiple parallel schedule paths, each with their own 
variability or uncertainty, converge at a single activity or 
milestone. This “merge bias” effect reduces the probability of 
starting or finishing the merged task on time [3]. 
Similarly, projects may not perform adequate assessments of 
risk. In fact, risks could be overlooked, underestimated in 
terms of probability or impact, or even ignored. If these risks 
occur, projects may not be fully prepared to recover from 
their impactsespecially if the risks occur late in the project 
life cycle. Another theme concerns the occurrence of actual 
problems and their impact on project performance. The 
occurrence of technical or programmatic problems such as 
parts shortages, test failures, or resource shortfalls result in 
performance inefficiencies, rework, or troubleshooting that 
delays the schedule and increases cost. 
Too often intangible factors such as inexperienced project 
leadership, lack of documented processes, complicated 
organizational structures, or strained interpersonal relations 
between team members can contribute to schedule delays as 
well. These occurrences may accumulate and decrease 
efficiency in performing the project work, impacting the 
schedule at the task level. 
 
Figure 1. NOAA-N’ Mishap Impacted Launch Schedule 
 
Finally, rare and highly improbable “black swan” events may 
occur that impact the schedule. These events are truly 
“showstoppers” that often result in a termination of the 
project before its product can operate or produce results. In 
other cases, the occurrence of “black swan” events 
necessitate a major restructuring of a project. For example, in 
September 2003, the NOAA-N’ satellite was badly damaged 
during integration at the Lockheed Martin Space Systems 
factory in Sunnyvale, CA. As the integration and test team 
was turning the satellite into a horizontal position, it fell to 
the floor, as shown in Figure 1 [4]. 
 
3. INTERDEPENDENCY OF SCHEDULE AND COST 
Many large organizations have articulated that schedule and 
cost are very closely correlated. Observations, studies, and 
research into cost and schedule related topics have been 
performed by organizations such as NASA, the United States 
Department of Defense, Booz Allen Hamilton, and The 
Aerospace Corporation. These studies have repeatedly found 
close correlations to schedule delays and cost overruns, 
although correlation does not necessarily mean causality. 
Therefore, while we can observe that both cost and schedule 
may move in the same direction (i.e., overrun), other factors 
may be responsible for driving the schedule delay which, in 
turn, contributes to the cost growth. 
When cost growth is identified in a project, schedule growth 
is usually experienced and vice versa. Likewise, when project 
risks become problems, they will often result in schedule 
delays and cost overruns as well. As Mike Cole pointed out 
in his 2012 NASA Project Management (PM) Challenge 
presentation, the various aspects of project management can 
only be effectively managed and mitigated if the schedule, 
cost, and risk planning and execution are fully integrated [5]. 
NASA and The Aerospace Corporation conducted a study, 
summarized in a NASA PM Challenge 2010 presentation by 
C. Freaner, B. Bitten, and D. Emmons, to characterize the 
properties of cost growth and schedule delays as they related 
to the phase of the project as well as to technical resource 
growth. While the study of 20 of NASA’s recently completed 
science missions did not investigate the causes of schedule 
delays and cost overruns, it revealed an interesting 
relationship between cost and schedule. The study found a 
correlation between cost and schedule growth of these 
projects of R2 = 0.61, as shown in Figure 2 [6]. According to 
Bitten, the “general rule of thumb is that for every percent of 
schedule growth, there is an equal or greater percent of cost 
growth.” He further stated that “almost all [cost overruns] 
started with schedule delays that lead to cost growth” [7]. 
Similarly, an earlier Aerospace Corporation study of 40 
NASA science missions revealed that a 10 percent increase 
in schedule correlates to a 12 percent increase in cost [8]. 
In general, a schedule delay means that the cost will increase. 
Since most aspects of the cost estimate can be impacted by 
speeding up or slowing down the schedule, the relationship 
between cost and schedule appears to be highly correlated 
intuitively. However, some factors affect cost without an 
accompanying impact to schedule, such as labor or indirect 
rate changes. Inflation and changes in the estimated cost due 
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to negotiations are two more factors that have little impact on 
schedule. Additionally, while implementing schedule 
workarounds may avoid or reduce the impact of schedule 
delays, they would also likely increase the project cost or 
reduce reserves. Fuel and materials cost increases, as well as 
the cost of implementing risk mitigation plans may also 
increase project costs without delaying the schedule. 
Conversely, schedule delays do not always result in cost 
overruns. A well-integrated cost and schedule plan with 
sufficient margin in funds and time can accommodate some 
schedule delays without impacting the final cost, though cost 
reserves may be impacted. A prime example of this situation 
was experienced on a previous NASA GSFC project. A 
funding shortfall for the fiscal year forced the project to delay 
the procurement of long lead parts for a major subsystem. 
Through careful schedule workarounds and negotiation of 
waivers to incrementally fund fixed price contracts, the 
project was able to sustain the schedule slip without an 
increase in the overall funds required by the project. The 
schedule slip was mitigated avoiding a cost overrun. 
 
4. ROOT CAUSES OF SCHEDULE DELAYS AND 
COST OVERRUNS 
Many experienced project practitioners would agree that 
schedule slips and cost overruns are highly correlated 
because the same root causes impact both cost and schedule. 
But, are schedule slips themselves root causes of cost 
overruns or are these delays just a result of other root causes? 
If we define a root cause as the initiating condition that 
directly leads to an undesirable outcome which could have 
been avoided by some form of intervention, then a schedule 
slip cannot be a root cause [9]. The schedule slip is akin to 
the fire that burned down a vacant house. The fire is directly 
related to the burned down house, but what caused the fire in 
the first place? 
When gathering research for this paper, the authors posed this 
question to various project practitioners: are schedule delays 
the root cause of cost overruns? Responses to this question 
were interesting. 
According to one project practitioner, “that’s a bit like asking 
which came first, the chicken or the egg! I’ve seen plenty of 
research that shows cost and schedule overruns are 
correlated, but correlation does not mean causality. In most 
cases, I think both cost and schedule overruns are caused by 
another factor, like underestimating the scope of work, over-
estimating the productivity of the people doing the work, 
underbidding the job, and many more. Schedule growth is a 
symptom of these problems, but not a root cause.” 
Another practitioner agreed with the position above stating 
that “I would probe the reason or reasons behind the schedule 
delay. I think you would find that the schedule delay isn’t the 
root cause but rather a related impact.” 
Still another respondent put it succinctly, “a high correlation 
between cost and schedule [leads me] to conclude that we 
Figure 2. Correlation between Cost and Schedule for 20 NASA Projects 
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should assign the same factors to cost growth and schedule 
growth (and vice versa).” 
A recent study, performed by the Joint Space Cost Council, 
dated April 15, 2015, points to poorly defined scope and 
planning to funding profiles as the most common reasons for 
cost impacts in Earned Value Management Systems [10]. 
This finding is consistent with a 2012 NASA Inspector 
General Audit Report [11] which concluded that NASA’s 
cost, schedule, and performance failures could be traced to 
four main challenges: 
(1) Over optimism, which is pervasive in the NASA culture. 
This prevents project teams from estimating realistic 
costs, schedules, and technical risks at the project outset. 
(2) Underestimating technical complexity, whether 
intentionally or through lack of adequate scope 
definition. The resulting ill-defined scope increases the 
cost and schedule. 
(3) Funding instability. Continuous lack of stable funding 
profiles and solid knowledge of funding for projects 
force project managers to make decisions that are often 
inefficient, resulting in cost and schedule growth. 
(4) Limited opportunities for project manager development. 
Without a broad-based project organization which 
provides learning and growth opportunities at the project 
team level, project managers are sometimes given jobs 
for which they are not adequately prepared. Learning 
project management “on the job” can allow for mistakes 
and inefficiencies in the decision making process which 
in turn, causes cost and schedule growth. 
NASA’s Advisory Council also acknowledged many other 
reasons for cost and schedule growth in their 2009 report, as 
represented in Table 2. This table shows that inadequate 
definition and over optimistic estimates have been 
recognized for most of NASA’s history. In the 1990s, as the 
Federal budget became tighter, funding stability was 
introduced as another cause of cost growth. Likewise, in the 
same timeframe, as in-house technical opportunities 
disappeared, the lack of adequate project management 
training opportunities also became an issue for NASA. 
These various studies and observations support the idea that 
schedule delays and cost overruns are closely related and that 
while some factors and causes impact both cost and schedule, 
often problems will first manifest themselves in a time delay 
which, in turn, leads to cost growth. Additionally, there is one 
characteristic, unique to logic-based project schedules, which 
may actually create the conditions that directly lead to 
schedule delays on complex projects:  merge bias.
Table 2. NASA Advisory Council Meeting:  Reasons for Cost Growth in NASA Projects 
Cost Growth Reasons 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Inadequate Definitions Prior to Agency Budget Decision and to 
External Commitments 
X X X X 
Optimistic Cost Estimates/Estimating Errors X X X X 
Inability to Execute Initial Schedule Baseline X X X X 
Inadequate Risk Assessments X X X X 
Higher Technical Complexity of Projects than Anticipated X X X X 
Changes in Scope (Design/Content) X X X X 
Inadequate Assessment of Impacts of Schedule Changes on Cost  X X X 
Annual Funding Instability   X X 
Eroding In-House Technical Expertise   X X 
Poor Tracking of Contractor Requirements Against Plans   X X 
Launch Vehicle   X  
Reserve Position Adequacy  X  X 
Lack of Probabilistic Estimating  X  X 
"Go As You Can Afford" Approach    X 
Lack of Formal Document for Recording Key Technical, Schedule, and 
Programmatic Assumptions 
   X 
Source:  NASA Advisory Council Meeting:  Report of Audit and Finance Committee, Kennedy Space Center, February 5, 2009. 
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As introduced earlier and referenced in Table 1, merge bias is 
the impact of having two or more parallel paths of activities, 
each with its own variability or uncertainty, merge into one 
milestone or other activity. This somewhat arcane concept is 
not well understood by project teams, yet its effect can have 
serious consequences for the project schedule [12]. Figure 3 
illustrates merge bias. 
 
Figure 3. Merge Bias Illustrated 
Consider the three independent, parallel activities which feed 
into the delivery milestone in Figure 3. Each has been 
scheduled to finish by June 5 so the delivery milestone of June 
5 can be met. However, each task has a completion probability 
of .70—in other words, each has a 70 percent probability of 
finishing by June 5. Since each of the three tasks are required 
to successfully complete the June 5 delivery milestone, the 
product of these task’s completion probabilities is the true 
probability of delivering by June 5. .70 x .70 x .70 = .34. 
Merge bias drives the probability of delivering by June 5 as 
planned down to 34 percent! Simply put, the more paths that 
merge into another task or milestone, the more there is to go 
wrong which could delay the schedule. 
Now consider complex projects such as the spacecraft and 
ground system development projects at GSFC with hundreds 
or even thousands of interdependencies between tasks. The 
sheer complexity of the schedule is quantified in the merge 
bias phenomena. Merge bias is not a metric reported at 
program reviews. In the authors’ experience it has never been 
addressed or discussed during the project planning process, at 
risk reviews, schedule status meetings, or during Integrated 
Baseline Reviews. On rare occasions it has been discussed by 
programmatic analysts as part of the independent review 
board process on some projects at NASA. Perhaps the project 
planning and control process would benefit from additional 
insight into the merge bias phenomena. 
Schedule logic is a primary way to characterize project 
complexity. While missing or faulty logic is a concern, 
overlooking the effect of merge bias could be considered a 
cause of schedule delays if not fully considered in the risk 
assessment and schedule margin planning processes. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Organizations and project teams that recognize the factors 
that may contribute to, or cause, schedule delays and cost 
growth, and takes steps to reduce or eliminate their impact, 
are better positioned for project success. Indeed, some of 
these factors are clearly understood such as discrete risk 
events, while others are more subtle such as team conflict 
internally or with a supplier. Process-based challenges in 
areas such as overoptimistic planning and estimating are well 
known, but more esoteric concepts such as merge bias can 
impact the project schedule and ultimately project cost if not 
recognized, understood, and addressed. 
Are “80 to 90 percent of cost overruns due to schedule,” as 
suggested previously? If we define “due to” as meaning 
related to or associated with, it does appear that the majority 
of cost overruns do trace back to, or in some way involve, the 
project schedule. This relationship of schedule to cost can be 
as direct as a test failure and its associated rework, or more 
subtle such as assigning more systems engineers to reduce a 
back-log of discrepancy reports from testing or to work off 
requests for action from design reviews. Unrealistic or flawed 
productivity assumptions for software development on the 
front-end of the planning process could be a factor driving 
schedule and cost, while too many unnecessary management 
reviews distracting the team on the back end of project 
execution could be another. Lack of robust schedule risk 
analysis could result in overlooking not only the impact of 
discrete risk events on the schedule, but also the effect of 
merge bias and insufficient margin levels. Even restrictions 
on travel, lack of discipline in schedule management, and 
resource conflicts or shortfalls can impact or influence both 
schedule and cost. 
Continuing to maintain an awareness of the challenges 
associated with schedule delays and cost overruns among 
projects teams on complex projects is a vital and necessary 
step in reducing the likelihood and consequences of problems 
in the future. Logical steps that organizations can take to 
foster this awareness include: 
- Conduct pause and learn workshops or after action 
reviews to analyze the reasons and implications for 
significant schedule delays and cost overruns on 
projects when significant adverse events occur. 
- Implement standardized program planning and control 
practices that are repeatable and that the entire 
organization can use. 
- Evolve cost basis of estimates (BOEs) into more 
integrated BOEs that incorporate a robust schedule 
component, particularly schedule assumptions if 
specific conditions are unknown at estimate time. 
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- Encourage more widespread use of probabilistic 
schedule risk analysis to cross check schedule margin 
level adequacy and better understand risk priorities. 
- Formulate a complexity index for the project or the 
schedule that would provide further insight into 
potential schedule volatility. Growth in task 
dependencies within the IMS might be a suitable 
starting point for such an index. 
- Simplify or streamline techniques for calculating earned 
value on small scale projects. (GSFC developed a 
handbook for earned value determination for small 
projects and Class D missions as part of the BCI.) 
- Devise a basic approach to contingency planning to 
more effectively respond to potentially catastrophic 
risks. Areas of focus would include alerting the project 
team, establishing safety procedures for travelers, or 
initiating additional safeguards and recovery of 
electronic data. 
- Implement more robust internal programmatic 
assessments that augment routine status-oriented 
project reviews. Executive leadership simply cannot 
absorb all of the programmatic data for all projects. 
Proper programmatic analysis can independently 
evaluate project performance and provide helpful 
feedback and recommendations to both project and 
executive leadership. 
Table 3 summarizes these approaches and associated impacts 
and outcomes. Both schedule and cost will always matter on 
projects, especially complex projects like those at NASA 
GSFC. Cost and schedule are two sides of the same coin, and 
schedule-driven cost growth is a serious concern. On complex 
projects, while the relationship between the two can be direct 
and obvious, other times it is more subtle and not so obvious. 
But for most projects, most of the time, project practitioners 
can agree that time is money. Put another way, as the schedule 
goes, so goes the cost.
Table 3. Recommendations for Enhancing Cost/Schedule Insight 
Recommendations for Enhancing 
Cost/Schedule Insight 
Affected Project Management 
Processes Impact/Outcome 
Pause & Learn Workshops (after a 
major cost/schedule impact event) 
Lessons learned/knowledge sharing Inform other projects 
Development of standard Project 
Planning and Control processes and 
practices 
Scheduling, EVM, cost estimating, risk 
management, resource management 
Process repeatability across the 
enterprise 
Integrated BOEs (cost and schedule) Cost and schedule estimating More accurate cost and schedule 
estimates 
Probabilistic risk analysis Risk management; schedule margin 
planning; risk-informed decision 
making 
Robust margins; counter merge bias; 
better decisions 
Project complexity index Risk management; schedule margin 
planning; risk-informed decision 
making 
Robust margins; counter merge bias; 
better decisions 
Streamlined EVM techniques for small 
projects 
EVM, management reporting Integration of cost and schedule; 
better project performance 
accountability 
Project contingency planning Risk management Improved reaction to "black swan" 
events (i.e., safety, data back-up, 
asset protection, team 
communications) 
Internal programmatic assessments Risk-informed decision making Better project performance 
accountability; better decisions 
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